Missiles, Secrets, and Seals of Approval: How ANSI–ANAB Opened the Door to China and Russia

WASHINGTON - EntSun -- I. INTRODUCTION — What If Our Secrets Weren't Stolen… But Given Away?

After Guberman exposed these documents during the April 17, 2024, DHS Subcommittee meeting https://www.newstribune.com/photos/2024/apr/18/3749044/

In the early 2000s, the United States quietly advanced a new class of defense weapons: hypersonic missile systems, developed by Boeing, tested by the U.S. Navy, and approved under America's trusted quality infrastructure.

These technologies—once thought secure behind classified firewalls and military protocols—were not compromised through Hollywood-style espionage, but legally handed over through a certification framework trusted by every branch of U.S. defense and manufacturing.

The real threat wasn't a hacker in the shadows.

It was the American accreditation system itself: ANSI–ANAB, and the foreign-led entities it reports into, including the IAF and ILAC.

II. A Real Attack: The 2018 Navy Breach

On June 8, 2018, The Washington Post broke a critical story: Chinese hackers had infiltrated a U.S. Navy contractor connected to the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, stealing over 614 gigabytes of highly sensitive data.

This trove included:

• Plans for a supersonic anti-ship missile
• Cryptographic material
• U.S. submarine warfare technology

📎 Source: Washington Post

While the breach was attributed to cyber theft, few questioned how such information was available outside a classified zone—or how China knew precisely what to target.

The answer lies in who had access upstream.

III. Who Let Them In? The Accreditation Web

ANSI–ANAB (American National Standards Institute & American National Accreditation Board) is the entity responsible for accrediting the labs, defense contractors, and auditors that handle sensitive data—including those working on weapons systems.

But ANSI–ANAB isn't isolated.

It reports up to the International Accreditation Forum (IAF)—headquartered in Delaware, with overlapping ownership by ANSI–ANAB—and its twin global body, ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation), based in Australia. ANSI-ANAB are underwriters for IAF-ILAC which means they assume all legal responsibility for systematic and product failures IAF-ILAC are associations of national and international accreditation bodies equivalent to ANSI-ANAB accreditation.

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From 2015 to 2021, the IAF was chaired by Xiao Jianhua (who has been involved with our quality since 1994), a Chinese Communist Party national, who also certified the Wuhan Institute of Virology in 2017.The laboratory 6 months before certification and 6 months after was lacking highly trained technicians.

The Wuhan Lab Wasn't Just Certified — It Was Enabled: How U.S. Accreditation Helped Build a Global Crisis
https://www.prlog.org/13078085-the-wuhan-lab-wasnt-just-certified-it-was-enabled-how-us-accreditation-helped-build-global-crisis.html

Under China's National Intelligence Law (Article 7), Xiao was legally obligated to report any data he accessed or was exposed to directly to the Chinese state.

And during this same period, U.S. government agencies including the Department of Defense, FBI, and Department of Homeland Security were sitting board members of ANSI–ANAB, essentially reporting into the IAF.

IV. China and Russia: Dual Threat (2016–2021)

From 2016 to 2021, both China and Russia escalated cyber infiltration campaigns targeting U.S. defense contractors.

But while the U.S. emphasized building firewalls, the backdoor had already been opened—via certifications, audits, and product approvals led by foreign-controlled organizations.

According to cybersecurity records and defense analyses, the accreditation chain was the weakest link, and it stayed open.

📎 Source: Wikipedia – Chinese Espionage

V. FBI: The Warnings and the Contradiction

In 2017, President Donald J. Trump appointed Christopher Wray as FBI Director, a role he would hold until 2025. Throughout his tenure, Wray delivered numerous warnings before Congressional and Senate subcommittees that China represented the greatest counterintelligence threat to U.S. national security.

"We must maintain vigilance," he warned.

📎 Video: FBI Wray on China



But during these very years—2017 to 2021—the FBI itself was a participating board member of ANSI–ANAB, which in turn reported into the IAF, then chaired by a Chinese Communist Party official under legal obligation to transmit data to Beijing.

This creates a brutal contradiction:

While Wray sounded alarms in public, the FBI—alongside DOD and DHS—was embedded in a system reporting to a hostile foreign regime.

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In effect, his congressional warnings were rendered moot by structural hypocrisy.

What was said in public was undermined by what was accepted in practice.

VI. Collapse by Design—or by Neglect?

This wasn't a single data breach. It was a system failure.

• Defense contractors working on top-secret missile platforms were accredited by labs and auditors tied to ANSI–ANAB
• ANSI–ANAB reported into the IAF, led by a CCP national
• That leader was legally required to report back to the Chinese government
• Meanwhile, U.S. defense agencies trusted these credentials to approve weapons work, cryptographic systems, and cybersecurity infrastructure

This system was not hacked. It was built this way.

And when the missile data leaked in 2018, it wasn't a surprise—it was the inevitable result of a supply chain of trust managed by adversaries.

VII. Armor with Holes: The "Helmet Trap" Analogy

Imagine certifying a soldier's helmet for combat—and giving the blueprint to the enemy during testing.

That's precisely what occurred when ANSI–ANAB and IAF,ILAC approved contractors and systems related to hypersonic missile technologies. The certifications were sound—but the supply chain behind them was corrupted.

This wasn't espionage. It was exposure by approval.

VIII. GLOBAC: A New Shield or a New Shell Game?

In the wake of increased scrutiny post-2021, ANSI–ANAB, IAF, and ILAC formed a new umbrella organization: GLOBAC.

GLOBAC claims to modernize and globalize certification systems—but when questions arise about data loss, blame is passed in circles:

• GLOBAC says, "Ask IAF."
• IAF says, "Ask ANSI–ANAB."
• ANSI–ANAB points back to the framework.

No one is accountable. And no one is secure.

IX. What Must Be Done

The integrity of America's defense future depends on actions—not audits. Congress must:

• Remove all foreign nationals from U.S.-affiliated accreditation boards
• Mandate ANSI–ANAB and similar bodies fall under federal oversight
• Force U.S. agencies( DOJ, FBI, FDA, FAA, DHS, Department of Commerce  ) and other federal agencies to resign from ANSI–ANAB until foreign ties are severed
• Enact legislation mandating domestic-only certification for defense systems, labs, and contractors
• DHS, DOJ, Department of Commerce, FDA are not just members of ANSI-ANAB but they are CUSTOMERS!
• 40+ Year Quality Expert Daryl Guberman designate as OVERSIGHT for this operation (203 556 1493)

X. Conclusion — The Final War Won't Be Fought With Guns

The next war won't be fought with brute force.

It'll be fought with speed, secrecy, and information superiority.

If we allow adversaries to sit inside our certification system, we don't lose to hackers—we lose to ourselves.

Let this not be another footnote in congressional testimony.

Let it be the line where America draws the boundary—and locks the gate.