"FRAUD: Federal Reliance, Regulatory Blindness, ANAB Misrepresentation, Unchecked Conflicts, And Deception -The Guberman Definition

EVERETT, Wash. - EntSun -- From 2018 through 2026, Quality Expert- Boeing Shareholder Daryl Guberman has documented what he calls a national and international accreditation breakdown affecting federal agencies, aerospace manufacturers, and suppliers across every major U.S. and Global industry. His findings center on the ANSI National Accreditation Board (ANAB) and its international equivalents operating under MLA (Multilateral Recognition Arrangement) and MRA (Mutual Recognition Arrangement) agreements.

At the heart of his discovery is U.S. Department of State Contract 19AQMM18R0131, where ANAB was described as an underwriter — a term that implies regulatory authority and financial risk assumption. Guberman argues that this description misled agencies and contractors into believing ANAB held powers it does not possess.

He refers to this eight‑year period as "The GUBERMAN Anomaly-Discovery. Guberman Anomaly https://guberman-quality.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GUBERMAN-ANOMALY-FEBRUARY-2026.docx.pdf "

Below is the FRAUD framework he uses to summarize the systemic failures he uncovered:

F — Federal Reliance on a Broken Accreditation System

According to Guberman's analysis, multiple federal agencies — including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Commerce (DOC), Department of Transportation (DOT), and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) — were simultaneously board members of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and customers of its accreditation arm, ANAB. PICTURE 3 (ANSI TAX FORM)

He argues that this dual role created a structural conflict: agencies responsible for oversight were aligned with the very body they relied on for accreditation integrity.

R — Regulatory Blindness That Endangered Every Contract

Guberman asserts that federal agencies accepted ANAB‑accredited certifications without independently verifying ANAB's claimed authorities.

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This regulatory blind spot, he says, affected:

• Federal contracts
• Supplier qualifications
• Aerospace manufacturing
• Defense procurement
• Industrial supply chain

He argues that the misrepresentation on the 2018 contract propagated through the entire system.

A — ANAB's Misrepresentation Embedded Across Government

Contract 19AQMM18R0131 described ANAB as an underwriter.

Guberman states that this description:

• Influenced federal reliance

• Was repeated across agencies
• Was assumed to be accurate
• Became embedded in procurement and compliance systems

He argues and proves, that this misrepresentation compromised the legitimacy of certifications issued under ANAB and its MLA/MRA international partners.

U — Unchecked Conflicts Spanning DHS, FAA, DOT, SEC, FAA, FTC, DOD, etc.)

Guberman's findings show that these agencies sat on ANSI–ANAB boards while depending on ANAB for accreditation.

He argues that this created a closed loop where oversight, enforcement, and accreditation were intertwined — with no independent separation of duties.

D — Deception That Compromised Oversight From 2018–Present

Guberman states that the misrepresentation on the 2018 contract, combined with federal participation in ANSI–ANAB, created a chain reaction affecting aerospace certification, supplier integrity, and public safety.

He argues that this breakdown constitutes a systemic deception that has persisted through 2026.

Impact Beyond Aerospace: Every Industry, Every Supplier Globally

Guberman emphasizes that this issue is not limited to aerospace.

He asserts that any supplier using ANAB accreditation or MLA/MRA‑equivalent accreditation between 2018–2026 may have produced materials whose certification lineage cannot be independently verified.

This includes:

• Metals
• Plastics
• Flooring
• Fasteners (nuts, bolts, screws)
• Structural hardware
• Industrial components
• Chemical materials
• Electrical components
• Any product requiring certified quality management

According to Guberman's analysis, no Certificate of Compliance (CoC) can be trusted if the accreditation authority itself was misrepresented.

He argues that such materials should be quarantined or reevaluated until their certification chain is independently validated.

Aerospace: Fixed‑Wing, Rotary‑Wing, and Defense Aircraft

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Guberman's most serious concern involves aerospace manufacturing, where AS9100 (Aerospace Quality Management System Standard) certifications accredited by ANAB or MLA/MRA equivalents are widely used.

He argues:

• Once a heat‑treated, bonded, welded, or riveted part is installed in an aircraft, it cannot be re‑tested without destruction.
• Therefore, if the accreditation chain is compromised, the integrity of the installed part cannot be verified.
• This creates systemic uncertainty for aircraft manufactured or maintained between 2018–2026.

According to Guberman's analysis:

"No FAA waiver — past, present, or future — can retroactively validate a broken accreditation chain."

Historical FAA–Boeing Conflicts Mirror the Same Structural Failures

Guberman draws parallels to long‑standing FAA–Boeing issues, including:

• FAA allowing Boeing to self‑certify critical systems beginning around 2009
• Oversight failures related to the MCAS system which killed 346 people on the Ethiopian and Indonesian airlines 2018-2019
• FAA inspectors who were paid by Boeing while acting as FAA representatives.
• This structure in essence made Boeing's CEO an FAA administrator (which no news outlet will admit too)

He argues that these historical conflicts demonstrate how structural entanglements can undermine safety and oversight — the same pattern he identifies in the ANSI–ANAB system.

Media Silence and Public Accountability

Guberman asserts that major news organizations (Bloomberg, Politico, Reuters, etc) have avoided reporting on these findings due to:

• Corporate relationships

• Advertising pressures
• Fear of exposing federal‑level conflicts
• Risk of destabilizing aerospace and industrial markets

He argues that the public has been shielded from the full truth and that transparency is now essential for national safety and global supply‑chain integrity.

For decades, forty‑year quality expert and Boeing shareholder Daryl Guberman has watched major media bury stories that threaten their corporate and federal alliances. That's why he uses PRLog — one of the only platforms not controlled by those entanglements. The proof was undeniable on April 17, 2024, when Guberman showed Bloomberg and Politico the 2002 Boeing documents revealing 22 years of abandoned on‑site auditing — now 24 years in 2026 https://www.newstribune.com/photos/2024/apr/18/3749044/ . They admitted the evidence was real but refused to report it because "people wouldn't fly." Reuters has done the same, contradicting documented facts despite the data being in hand. To Guberman, this isn't bias — it's structural protection. PRLog is where the truth goes when national media won't touch it.

Conclusion

Guberman's FRAUD framework is intended to force a national conversation about:

• Accreditation integrity
• Federal oversight
• Supplier reliability
• Aerospace safety
• Government transparency

https://youtu.be/zweWbsIGc7o